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Casenotes
RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE-CoNsIGNmNT AGREEmENTS-
Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13 (1964).
Simpson leased a gasoline service station for a twelve-month
period from Union Oil Company and was required by the com-
pany to sign a consignment agreement. Under the agreement,
Union Oil not only retained title to all consigned gasoline until it
was sold, but also reserved the power to establish the retail price.
Simpson sold gasoline below the set price in order to meet local
competition, and Union Oil thereupon refused to renew the lease
on the ground that Simpson had violated the consignment agree-
ment. Simpson sued for treble damages under section 4 of the
Clayton Act" on the ground that the consignment-lease agreement
was in violation of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act.2 Union
Oil was granted summary judgment by the district court,3 and this
decision was affirmed by the court of appeals.4 The United
States Supreme Court reversed,5 holding that the consignment-
lease agreement was used as a coercive price fixing device in
violation of the Sherman Act.
1 Section 4 of the Clayton Act provides: "Any person who shall be
injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in
the antitrust laws may sue therefor . . . and shall recover threefold
the damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a rea-
sonable attorney's fee." 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1958).
2 Section 1 of the Sherman Act provides: "Every contract, combination
in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade
or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is
declared to be illegal .... " 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15
U.S.C. § 1 (1958).
Section 2 of the Sherman Act provides: "Every person who shall
monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any
other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or com-
merce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be
deemed guilty of a misdemeanor .... ." 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as
amended, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1958).
3 Simpson v. Union Oil Co., TRADE REG. REP. (1961 Trade Cas.) 69936,
at 77693 (N.D. Cal. 1960).
4 Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 311 F.2d 764 (9th Cir. 1963). The court of
appeals declined to rule on the legality of the consignment agreement,
holding that no actionable damage had been shown even if the agree-
ment were assumed to be unlawful.
5 Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13 (1964). With respect to damages,
the Court said: "We disagree with the Court of Appeals that there
is no actionable wrong or damage if a Sherman Act violation is as-
sumed. If the 'consignment' agreement achieves resale price main-
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I. RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE
In 1911, the Supreme Court held, in Dr. Miles Medical Co. v.
John D. Park & Sons Co.,6 that a resale price maintenance agree-
ment between a supplier and his distributor was an unlawful
restraint of trade in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act.
Although Congress has since exempted such vertical price fixing
agreements 7 from the antitrust laws in states where they are
authorized by fair trade laws,8 resale price maintenance agree-
ments continue to be unlawful in those states not having such a
statute.9 In the absence of a fair trade act, or where difficulty
is encountered in enforcing resale price maintenance agreements
tenance in violation of the Sherman Act, it and the lease are being
used to injure interstate commerce . . . ." Id. at 16. The Court re-
manded the case for a hearing, inter alia, on the issue of damages, but
expressed no opinion on what the measure of damages should be.
Simpson apparently asked only for damages caused by Union Oil's re-
fusal to renew his lease. He did not claim damages which might have
accrued as a result of his inability to set retail prices during the time
the consignment-lease agreement was in effect, possibly because such
damages would have been difficult to prove in view of the fact that
he had established his own retail prices in spite of the agreement. In
Osborn v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 324 F.2d 566 (4th Cir. 1963), which also
involved an unlawful refusal to renew a service station lease, it was
held that the lessee could recover both for damages incurred during
the operation of the unlawful agreement and for damages caused by
the cancellation of his lease: "There is no justification in antitrust
law or in the general law of damages for limiting recovery to losses
sustained before the break in business relations." Id. at 573.
6 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
7 A resale price maintenance agreement between a manufacturer or
supplier and his distributors or dealers is generally referred to as
"vertical" price fixing as distinguished from "horizontal" price fixing,
which involves an agreement between competitors to fix prices.
8 Miller-Tydings Act, 50 Stat. 693 (1937), 15 U.S.CG § 1 (1958), amend-
ing 26 Stat. 209 (1890); McGuire Act, 66 Stat. 632 (1952), 15 U.S.C.
§ 45(a) (1958), amending 38 Stat. 719 (1914).
9 Although only six states do not have a fair trade law (Alaska, Kansas,
Missouri, Nebraska, Texas, and Vermont), four of the acts of the re-
maining forty-four states have been declared unconstitutional in gen-
eral and an additional nineteen have been held unconstitutional as
applied to nonsigners. The "nonsigner" provision contained in most
fair trade acts makes it unlawful for any person to knowingly resell
a fair trade commodity below the resale price established in any fair
trade contract or agreement whether that person is a party to such
agreement or not. Thus, the producer or vendor may bind all of his
customers, within the jurisdiction of a particular fair trade act, to
observe the established resale price by merely getting one of those
customers to sign a formal agreement and giving notice to the rest.
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under such a law,10 some producers have attempted various ar-
rangements designed to control retail prices without the aid of
fair trade legislation. Two arrangements which have met with
some success in avoiding the restrictions of the antitrust laws are:
(1) the refusal to deal; and (2) the agency or consignment agree-
ment.
A. REFUSAL To DEAL
In the classic case of United States v. Colgate & Co.," the
Supreme Court upheld the right of a manufacturer to select cus-
tomers on his own terms by allowing him to refuse to deal with
distributors who would not resell his product at a specified price.
In answer to the government's contention that this was an unlaw-
ful price-fixing device, the Court said:
The purpose of the Sherman Act is to prohibit monopolies,
contracts and combinations which probably would unduly inter-
fere with ... freedom to trade. In the absence of any purpose to
create or maintain a monopoly, the act does not restrict the long
recognized right of trader or manufacturer engaged in an en-
tirely private business, freely to exercise his own independent dis-
cretion as to parties with whom he will deal. And, of course, he
may announce in advance the circumstances under which he will
refuse to sell.12
The Colgate case arose, however, on the issue of the sufficiency of
the government's complaint, which the Court read as assuming
that no agreement, either express or implied, was involved. Such
an assumption, of course, made impossible any finding that trade
had been restrained by contract, combination, or conspiracy. Sub-
sequent decisions, however, have made it clear that where an
agreement, combination, or conspiracy can be found, either ex-
press or implied from a course of. dealing or other circumstances,
then the refusal to deal comes within the proscription of the
antitrust laws.13
In Simpson, Union Oil Company argued that it could properly
decline to renew Simpson's lease on the ground that he had failed
10 For a discussion of resale price maintenance under fair trade laws, see
Fulda, Resale Price Maintenance, 21 U. Cnz. L. REv. 175 (1954).
11-250 U.S. 300 (1919).
12 Id. at 307. (Emphasis added.)
'3 United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960); United States
v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 321 U.S. 707 (1944); FTC v. Beech-Nut
Packing Co., 257 U.S. 441 (1922); Frey & Son, Inc. v. Cudahy Packing
Co., 256 U.S. 208 (1921); United States v. A. Schrader's Son, Inc., 252
U.S. 85 (1920).
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to adhere to the specified prices, because such a course of action
was a simple refusal to deal. 14  The Supreme Court disagreed,
however, on the grounds that Union Oil's control over the retail
price was expressly provided in the consignment agreement and
that the agreement was used coercively. Union Oil did not merely
decline to deal further with Simpson because he had not adhered
to the suggested resale price, but rather because Simpson had not
honored his agreement to adhere to that price. The Court here
viewed the company's refusal to deal as an attempt to enforce
an unlawful price-fixing agreement and thus distinguishable from
that in Colgate, where no agreement, either express or implied,
was charged. In addition, the Court found that coercion was used
by Union Oil to force the consignment-lease agreements upon
independent service station operators. By so doing, the company
went beyond the mere right to choose customers on its own terms
in order to form agreements in restraint of trade. Therefore, the
Court concluded that Union Oil could not lawfully refuse to re-
new Simpson's lease merely because Simpson had violated the
consignment agreement which he had been coerced to sign.
B. AGENCY OR CONSIGNMENT AGREEmENT
Prior to Simpson, retail price maintenance through the use of
a consignment agreement was upheld in United States v. Gen-
eral Elec. Co.'5 Although that case involved the consignment of
a patented product by the owner of the patent, the Court appar-
ently did not restrict its ruling to patented articles.16 Describing
the use of agents as a legitimate marketing practice by a manu-
facturer who desires to sell his product directly to the consumer,
the Court said:
The owner of an article, patented or otherwise, is not violating
the common law, or the Anti-Trust Law, by seeking to dispose of
his article directly to the consumer and fixing the price by which
his agents transfer the title from him directly to such consumer. 17
This rather broad language indicates that price-fixing by consign-
ment does not violate the antitrust laws as long as the consign-
ment is bona fide. Such a conclusion is substantiated by com-
paring General Electric with Dr. Miles Medical Co. In the latter
14 The district court upheld this contention. Simpson v. Union Oil Co.,
TRADE REG. REP. (1961 Trade Cas.) f 69936, at 77696 (N.D. Cal. 1960).
15 272 U.S. 476 (1926).
16 See Klaus, Sale, Agency and Price Maintenance, 28 CoLUm. L. REV. 312
(1928).
17 272 U.S. at 488.
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decision, agency agreements covering the transactions involved
were held to be a sham, and hence the "consignment" was really
a "sale" subject to a resale price maintenance agreement. Also,
the legitimacy of consignment price maintenance as a lawful mar-
keting practice is supported by the fact that General Electric's
agency agreements were again sustained some twenty-three years
after the Supreme Court decision, even though the patents had
expired and certain modifications had been made in the operation
of the agencies. 8 Prior to Simpson, therefore, it appeared that
business could generally rely on the consignment device as a
means of controlling prices vertically without violating the anti-
trust laws and without resorting to fair trade laws.
Although the consignment agreements used by Union Oil
differed slightly from those used by General Electric, 9 the Court
in Simpson did not consider this difference to be significant.
Instead, the Court merely pointed out that General Electric in-
volved the consignment of a patented article and then declined to
extend the holding of that case beyond its facts. The dissent in
Simpson did not agree that General Electric could be distinguished
solely on the existence of a patent and concluded: "It is clear
* . .that the Court today overrules General Electric."20
This conclusion has merit in view of the fact that the majority
opinion relied principally on the argument that the controlling
consideration in General Electric was the proposition that "the
patent laws . . .are in pari materia with the antitrust laws and
modify them pro tanto."21 While the owner of a patent has an
exclusive right to make, use, or sell the patented article,22 pre-
18 United States v. General Elec. Co., 82 F. Supp. 753, 817-27 (D.N.J. 1949).
19 In General Electric, the consignee was responsible for lost, damaged,
or missing items from the stock in his possession, while the consignor
assumed all risks of fire, flood, and obsolescence. In Simpson, the
consignee was responsible for all gasoline lost or damaged, while the
consignor assumed the risks of earthquake, lightning, flood, fire, or
explosion not caused by the consignee's negligence.
In General Electric, the consignees were regular wholesale or retail
merchants of other merchandise, while in Simpson the consignees dealt
exclusively in the consignor's gasoline. The consignor in General Elec-
tric paid all taxes assessed on the stock of lamps and carried insurance
thereon, while the consignor in Simpson paid only property taxes and
apparently was not obligated to carry any insurance on the consigned
gasoline. See 377 U.S. at 23 n.10.
20 Id. at 29 (Stewart, J., dissenting). See also Handler, Recent Antitrust
Developments-1964, 63 MmcH. L. Rm,. 59, 60-67 (1964).
21 Id. at 24.
22 See 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1958).
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sumably the manufacturer of a nonpatented product also has a
right, although not an exclusive one, to make, use, and sell his
product. A fair construction of the patent monopoly with re-
spect to the antitrust laws should not allow the owner of a patent
to extend his monopoly beyond the express limits of his patent.
Therefore, the manufacturer of a patented product should not be
allowed to attach restrictions to the resale of that product which
unreasonably restrain trade while the manufacturer of a non-
patented product may not do so. 23 Indeed, it seems fair to con-
clude that the majority in Simpson merely saw in the existence
of the patent an opportunity to exercise judicial self-restraint to
avoid broadly overruling a prior decision. 24 Although the Court
was careful to defer a discussion of the issues in General Electric
until a similar case is presented, the principles under which the
consignment agreement in Simpson was held invalid appear to be
equally applicable to consignment price maintenance of a patented
article.
II. ANTITRUST POLICY
In Simpson, the consignment agreement was held unlawful,
not because it did not establish a valid agency relationship, but
merely because the antitrust policy of the government would not
allow the resulting vertical price control. The Court considered
the consignment agreement to be an attempt by Union Oil to
validate an otherwise unlawful vertical price control scheme:
When ... a "consignment" device is used to cover a vast
gasoline distribution system, fixing prices through many retail
outlets, the antitrust laws prevent calling the "consignment" an
agency .... The present, coercive "consignment" device, if suc-
cessful against challenge under the antitrust laws, furnishes a
wooden formula for administering prices on a vast scale. 25
Thus, even though the use of a consignment agreement was
within the right of Union Oil to sell directly to the consumer,
2-3 Boston Store v. American Graphophone Co., 246 U.S. 8 (1918); Straus
v. Victor Talking Mach. Co., 243 U.S. 490 (1917); Bauer & Cie v. O'Don-
nell, 229 U.S. 1 (1913).
24 Apparently conceding that general reliance may have been placed on
General Electric, the Court stated: "We reserve the question whether,
when all the facts are known, there may be any equities that would
warrant only prospective application in damage suits of the rule go-
verning price fixing by the 'consignment' device which we announce
today." 377 U.S. at 24-25. Such prospective application of the rule in
Simpson has been allowed by a district court. Lyons v. Westinghouse
Elec. Corp., 235 F. Supp. 526 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
25 377 U.S. at 21-22.
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the Court held that the resulting vertical price control could not
be tolerated under the general policy of the Sherman Act. Anti-
trust policy overrides even the right of a producer or supplier to
determine the price at which his product will be sold where the
result is retail price fixing: "[A] consignment, no matter how
lawful it might be as a matter of private contract law, must give
way before the federal antitrust policy."26
This limitation on the use of agents exemplifies the broad
power available to the Court under the Sherman Act to prevent
circumvention of the antitrust laws under the guise of basic
private rights.2 7  Indeed, under Simpson the principal test for
determining the legality of a consignment agreement appears to
be whether such an agreement is used as an indirect method of
controlling retail prices. This test, based on result rather than
form, was used earlier in United States v. Masonite Corp.,28
where agency agreements were not allowed to extend the statu-
tory grant of monopoly received under a patent. The Court made
it clear that it had "quite consistently refused to allow the form
into which the parties chose to cast the transaction to govern,"2
and then went on to say: "So far as the Sherman Act is con-
cerned, the result must turn not on the skill with which counsel
has manipulated the concepts of 'sale' and 'agency' but on the sig-
nificance of the business practices in terms of restraint of
trade."3 0
The holding in Simpson clearly indicates that the Supreme
Court considers vertical price control, even in the form of con-
signment price maintenance, to be contrary to the policy of the
antitrust laws, despite the fact that resale price maintenance ap-
parently has been thought by some to have enough redeeming
virtue to warrant exemption from the antitrust laws in the form
of state fair trade acts. Arguably, such a broad construction of
antitrust policy to prevent resale price maintenance may result in
a greater concentration of economic power, because firms will be
driven to vertical integration in order to gain some control over
26 Id. at 18.
'27 Use of the consignment agreement has also been held to be an unfair
method of competition under § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act,
38 Stat. 719 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1958). Sun Oil Co.,
TRADE RErG. REP. f 16418 (FTC 1963); Atlantic Ref. Co., TRADE REcG.
REP. 1 16422 (FTC 1963).
28 316 U.S. 265 (1942).
29 Id. at 278.
80 Id. at 280.
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resale prices.31 If manufacturers are not allowed to control resale
prices, even by using consignment agreements, some may resort
to ownership of retail outlets as a means of controlling retail
price competition. Vertical integration, however, is subject to the
monopoly and merger limitations of the antitrust laws.32  In
addition, most producers probably would not find it economically
desirable to own their retail outlets because of the large capital
investment which would be required and because of the adminis-
trative problems involved in controlling a diverse distribution
system. In any event, these speculations should not outweigh the
fact that, if methods such as consignment selling are allowed to
circumvent the antitrust laws, the result is vertical control by the
producer of what would otherwise be a freely competitive distri-
bution system. To prevent this stifling of competition on the re-
tail level, the Court in Simpson interpreted the Sherman Act as
a statement by Congress of a general antitrust policy, rather than
a proscription of certain specific business practices, and found
consignment price maintenance to be contrary to that antitrust
policy.
With the possible exception of Masonite, Simpson appears to
be the first case in which the Supreme Court has looked solely to
the result rather than to the form of a business practice used to
control retail prices. In both Dr. Miles Medical Co. and General
Electric, the principal question was whether a bona fide agency
relationship had been established,33 the right of a manufacturer to
31 "The economic theories which the Court has read into the Anti-Trust
Laws have favored rather than discouraged monopoly. As a result
• * * big business has become bigger and bigger. Monopoly has flour-
ished. Cartels have increased their hold on the nation. The trusts wax
strong. There is less and less place for the independent." Standard
Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 315 (1949) (Douglas, J., dis-
senting).
32 Section 2 of the Sherman Act, note 2 supra, prohibits monopolization.
Section 7 of the Clayton Act provides in part: "No corporation en-
gaged in [federally regulated] commerce shall acquire, directly or indi-
rectly, the whole or any part of the stock or other share capital and
no corporation subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Com-
mission shall acquire the whole or any part of the assets of another
corporation engaged also in commerce, where in any line of commerce
in any section of the country, the effect of such acquisition may be
substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly."
38 Stat. 731 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1958).
33 Cases involving agency agreements under § 3 of the Clayton Act, 38
Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1958) (prohibiting a sale or agree-
ment not to use the goods of a competitor), have also been concerned
primarily with the validity of the agency, not the result obtained by
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set the price at which his bona fide agents would sell his product
being assumed. In Simpson, however, the authenticity of the
agency was not even considered. Instead, the fact that the re-
sulting price control was contrary to the policy of the antitrust
laws was deemed sufficient to find a violation of the Sherman Act.
This approach to resale price maintenance could also be extended
to" other methods of vertical control, such as the refusal to
deal.34 If a simple unilateral refusal to deal is used successfully
by a supplier to maintain resale prices, a violation of the Sherman
Act could presumably be found because the result is contrary to
antitrust policy. Even though the means used is the right of a
private business entity to select its own customers, the antitrust
policy of the government, under the rationale of Simpson, would
prevent the use of that right to achieve vertical control of prices.
III. COERCIVE PRICE CONTROL
One factor which may limit the holding in Simpson is the
element of coercion which the court found Union Oil used to
impose the consignment agreements on previously independent
service station operators. By using coercion, Union Oil went
beyond the mere right to engage agents to sell directly to con-
sumers and thereby put together a combination unreasonably re-
straining trade. Under this interpretation, Simpson only places a
restriction on the consignment agreement similar to that already
placed on the refusal to deal, viz., coercion may not be used under
the Sherman Act to achieve resale price maintenance.35 In addi-
its use. FTC v. Curtis Publishing Co., 260 U.S. 568 (1923); Standard
Fashion Co. v. Magrane-Houston Co., 258 U.S. 346 (1922).
34 In addition to resale price maintenance, the refusal to deal has also
been involved in cases arising under § 3 of the Clayton Act, note 33
supra, and under the Robinson-Patman Act, 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15
U.S.C. § 13 (Supp. V, 1963), amending 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (prohibiting
price discrimination). Timken Roller Bearing Co. "v. FTC, 299 F.2d
839 (6th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 861 (1962); House of
Materials, Inc. v. Simplicity Pattern Co., 298 F.2d 867 (2d Cir. 1962);
McElhenney Co. v. Western Auto Supply Co., 269 F.2d 332 (4th Cir.
1959); Nelson Radio & Supply Co. v. Motorola, Inc., 200 F.2d 911 (5th
Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 925 (1953); Johnson v. J. H. Yost
Lumber Co., 117 F.2d 53 (8th Cir. 1941); Ben B. Schwartz & Sons, Inc.
v. Sunkist Growers, Inc., 203 F. Supp. 92 (E.D. Mich. 1962). Presum-
ably, the rationale of -Simpson could also be extended to refusals to
deal arising under these statutes in order to prevent results which are
contrary to antitrust policy. But see C.B.S. Business Equip. Corp. v.
Underwood Corp., TRADE REG. REP. 71341 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 30, 1964).
35 'When the manufacturer's actions ... go beyond mere announcement
of his policy and the simple refusal to deal, and he employs other
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tion, Simpson can be distinguished from General Electric on this
ground, lending support to the contention that General Electric
has not been overruled.
Although the agency device was coercively employed to
achieve resale price maintenance in Simpson, such a method of
circumventing the antitrust laws should not be tolerated even if
used with the willing compliance of all the agents. Even without
coercion, the fact remains that prices for an entire distribution
system may be administered by a single manufacturer through
the use of consignment agreements. Therefore, the result in
terms of restraint of trade is not significantly different from that
which may be attained through regular resale price maintenance.
Consignment price maintenance may still be proper in some cases,
but where it is used to restrict free competition among a vast
number of retailers, the policy of preserving free competition,
as it is embodied in the antitrust laws, outweighs the right of a
single producer to fix the price of goods sold on consignment.
IV. CONCLUSION
Although theoretically both the consignment or agency agree-
ment and the refusal to deal are within the legal right of a
manufacturer to choose a method of distributing his product,
neither should be allowed to accomplish a result contrary to the
policy of preserving free competition as expressed in the Sherman
Act. Principles are defined in Simpson which may effectively
place such a restriction on the consignment agreement and an
opportunity is provided for similarly limiting refusals to deal.
Such a course is in conformity with the trend of previous limita-
tions on resale price maintenance as shown by the fact that the
refusal to deal is already so restricted as to be of little use as an
effective price maintenance device in the majority of modern
business transactions. 36 In view of these broad restrictions under
the antitrust laws, it appears that in the future the producer or
supplier will have to look principally to fair trade legislation
for control of resale prices.
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means which effect adherence to his resale prices ... he has put
together a combination in violation of the Sherman Act." United
States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29, 44 (1960).
36 See Levi, The Parke, Davis-Colgate Doctrine: The Ban on Resale
Price Maintenance, 1960 Sup. CT. REV. 258.
